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WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT AND THE TAFT ARBITRATION TREATIES
JOHN E. NOYEs*
O NE of my favorite presidential quotes is from William Howard Taft:"International Law," he said, "is really a wonderful creation." In this
symposium, we celebrateJohn Murphy's wonderful creations, his contribu-
tions to international law, and his fortieth anniversary of law teaching. We
are also approaching another anniversary: the centenary of the two Taft
Arbitration Treaties with France and the United Kingdom, proposed in
1910 and signed on August 3, 1911, during Taft's single term as President
of the United States.2 Those treaties, which were never ratified, author-
ized one side in an interstate dispute to initiate arbitration of any justicia-
ble controversy. They made no exceptions for matters affecting "national
honor" or "vital national interests."
The Taft Arbitration Treaties represent one significant effort to legal-
ize international relations. The treaties were proposed, negotiated, and
promoted in an historical setting far different from today's. Nevertheless,
the Taft Arbitration Treaties help us think about the roles of formal third-
party dispute settlement mechanisms and the importance of utopian vi-
sions in shaping international law.
Part I of this Essay explains Taft's interest in international law, placing
it in historical context. In Part II, I outline key features of the treaties and
explore the debate over their ratification. Part III then reflects on the
significance of the treaties.
I. WILLiAM HowARD TAFr, INTERNATIONAL LAw,
AND THE PEACE MOVEMENT
William Howard Taft respected international law throughout his ca-
reer. His study of international law as an undergraduate provided, in the
words of one biographer, "a useful frame of reference" in his later career.3
* Roger J. Traynor Professor of Law, California Western School of Law.
Thanks to Thomas Barton, Dino Kritsiotis, and Sarah Seene, who commented on
drafts of this essay, and to Melissa Arnold, who provided valuable research
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1. William Howard Taft, Response to the American Society of International
Law (Apr. 29, 1911), in 5 AM. Soc'v INT'L L. PROC. 340, 341 (1911).
2. For the text of the treaties with France and the United Kingdom, see 5 AM.
J. INT'L L. 249 (Supp. 1911) and id. at 253, respectively. The treaties are hereinaf-
ter referred to collectively as the Taft Arbitration Treaties, and the U.S.-U.K. treaty
is reproduced in the Appendix.




After Taft left the presidency, he taught international law at Yale. 4 As Pres-
ident and private citizen, he often urged the enforcement of U.S. bilateral
treaties of amity, believing some U.S. states' treatment of immigrants vio-
lated those treaties.5
Taft sought not only to uphold existing international law, but to de-
velop it. He particularly favored formal third-party international dispute
settlement. In 1896 the American Conference on International Arbitra-
tion appointed Taft to an executive committee to promote a proposed
permanent system of arbitration between the United States and Great Brit-
ain, a system to which Taft gave his "emphatic endorsement."6 As Presi-
dent, Taft urged several ad hoc arbitrations, in addition to his bilateral
arbitration treaties with France and the United Kingdom.7 Taft himself
served as an international arbitrator, both before and during his tenure as
ChiefJustice of the U.S. Supreme Court (1921-1930).8
After his term as President, Taft headed the League to Enforce Peace.
The League's Charter incorporated features of the bilateral arbitration
treaties Taft had pursued as President.9 The League promoted enforcea-
ble international law: countries would submit justiciable controversies to
an international court, and would commit to using force against any state
that engaged in hostilities before going to court.1 0 Following World War
4. See FREDERICK C. HICKS, WILLAM HowARD TAFT: YALE PROFESSOR OF LAw &
NEw HAVEN CITIZEN 49-50 (1945).
5. See WILuAM HowARD TAFT, THE UNITED STATES AND PEACE 90-132 (1914).
6. THE AMERICAN CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION HELD IN WASH-
INGTON, D.C. APRIL 22 AND 23, 1896, at 88-89, 155 (New York, Baker & Taylor Co.
1896).
7. See 16 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS
7771, 7778-80 (James D. Richardson ed., 1913); PAOLO E. COLETTA, THE PRESI-
DENCY OF WILLIAM HowARD TAFr 168-69, 175 (1973). However, Taft equivocated
about whether the United States should arbitrate a dispute concerning exemptions
for U.S. vessels passing through the Panama Canal, exemptions the United King-
dom considered illegal under a U.S.-U.K treaty. The United States eventually re-
pealed the exemptions by legislation. See COLETTA, supra, at 174, 257; LEWIS L.
GOULD, THE WILLIAM HowARD TArr PRESIDENCY 187-89 (2009); 2 HENRY F. PRIN-
GLE, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF WILUAM HowARD TAr 651-53 (Archon Books 1964)
(1939); Taft for Canal Arbitration Now, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1913.
8. Most notably, while he was ChiefJustice of the U.S. Supreme Court, Taft
was the sole arbitrator in the Aguilar-Armory and Royal Bank of Canada Claims (Ti-
noco Arbitration) (Gr. Brit. v. Costa Rica), 1 R.I.A.A. 369 (1923). Chief Justice Taft
also served as an arbitrator in a boundary dispute between Panama and Costa Rica.
See BURTON, supra note 3, at 116. Before being named to the Supreme Court, Taft
was appointed to a three-person commercial arbitration panel that considered Ca-
nada's responsibility to British corporate shareholders. See Canada Asks Taft to Re-
present Her, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1920; Grand Trunk Stock Declared Worthless, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 8, 1921.
9. See William Howard Taft, Proposal of the League to Enforce Peace (June
17, 1915), in 7 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF WILLIAM HowARD TAFr: TAFr PAPERS ON
LEAGUE OF NATIONS 3 (Frank X. Gerrity ed., 2003) [hereinafter 7 COLLECTED
WORKS].
10. See RUHL J. BARTLETr, THE LEACUE To ENFORCE PEACE (1944); BURTON,
supra note 3, at 90-96, 101; PRINGLE, supra note 7, at 928-39; William Howard Taft,
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I, Taft also favored U.S. entry into the League of Nations and U.S. accept-
ance of the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice
(PCIJ).
Taft actively supported other international law organizations as well.
He thought non-governmental organizations could help educate the pub-
lic about international law and promote international codification and dis-
pute settlement. For example, Taft was an active Vice President of the
American Society of International Law. He resigned when he became
President of the United States, but continued as Honorary President of
the society and hosted receptions at the White House as part of the soci-
ety's annual meetings. Taft also served as Honorary President of the
American Society for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes,
which was formed in 1910. When the American Branch of the Interna-
tional Law Association was founded in 1922, Taft, by then ChiefJustice of
the U.S. Supreme Court, accepted an appointment as Honorary President
of that organization as well. I note thatJohn Murphy is an Honorary Vice
President and Patron of the American Branch. One of the many things I
admire about John is his commitment to international law organizations
and to their educational and law development efforts.
Taft of course spent time and energy on many issues other than the
development of international law. Tariffs and Interior Department con-
troversies occupied Taft during his presidency, as did efforts to advance
international trade through a program disparagingly dubbed "dollar di-
plomacy." The President weathered a crisis with Mexico and dealt with a
host of other international and domestic issues." Still, Taft devoted sig-
nificant attention to international law. Like many of his professional con-
temporaries, he was "dedicated to building world peace by legalizing the
conduct of international relations."12 Taft believed his arbitration trea-
ties, in particular, would be "the great jewel of my administration."13
In terms of the U.S. political spectrum of a century ago, Taft was con-
servative. Four significant candidates sought the presidency in 1912: Eu-
gene Debs, the Socialist; Woodrow Wilson, the Democratic nominee, who
would succeed Taft as President; Theodore Roosevelt, Taft's predecessor
as President, who ran on the Progressive ticket and drew support from the
progressive wing of the Republican party; and President William Howard
Taft, the Republican nominee, seeking his second term. The stances of
U.S. political parties a century ago do not translate neatly into the modern
Address at the World Court Congress, Cleveland, OH: Plan for a League of Na-
tions to Enforce Peace (May 12, 1915), in 7 CoLLECTED WORKs, supra note 9, at 36.
11. See FRANCIs L. BRODERICK, PROGRESSIVISM AT RISK: ELECTING A PRESIDENT IN
1912, at 32-36 (1989); DAVID H. BURTON, THE LEARNED PRESIDENCY: THEODORE
ROOSEvELT, WILuIAM HOWARD TArr, WOODROW WILSON 115-18 (1988).
12. MARK WESTONJANIs, AMERICA AND THE LAW OF NATIONS 1776-1939, at 144
(2010).
13. 2 ARCHIBALD W. Burr, TAFT AND ROOSEvELT: THE INTIMATE LETTERS OF
ARCHIE BUTT, MILITARY AIDE 635 (1930).
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U.S. political landscape, but Taft was on the right and pro-business ex-
treme of the 1912 political spectrum." In short, Taft was a conservative
Republican politician who strongly supported international law-and not
just existing international law, but its progressive development.
Several factors may well help explain Taft's efforts to legalize interna-
tional relations and his advocacy of arbitration treaties applicable to all
justiciable disputes. First, Taft was familiar with international issues and,
even before becoming President, saw in his professional work that treaties
could serve essential purposes. Taft served in the Roosevelt Administra-
tion as Governor General of the Philippines (1900-1903) and Secretary of
War (1904-1908). He pursued diplomatic initiatives in Panama and Cuba
and negotiated understandings or agreements with Japan and the Vati-
can.15 While working as Solicitor General of the United States (1890-
1892), Taft dealt with the intersection of international and national law
when he litigated a Behring Sea dispute with the United Kingdom.1 6
Second, Taft was a lawyer and a judge.17 More particularly, he vener-
ated courts and believed that judges would fairly apply rules of law.' 8 In
Taft's view, judges or arbitrators could fulfill that role on the international
as well as the national plane.19
Third, Taft valued order and stability. International legal mecha-
nisms-in particular, arbitral institutions-could contribute to a stable en-
vironment in which businesses and individuals would flourish.2 0 Taft
envisioned a more peaceful, orderly world and thought progress in law
and society was possible.2 ' His vision of international law was largely posi-
tivist, in keeping with mainstream early twentieth-century views about the
"scientific" foundations of the discipline. If the world lacked legal struc-
14. See BRODERICK, supra note 11, at 169-70.
15. See id. at 27-29.
16. See BURTON, supra note 3, at 18-19.
17. In addition to working as Solicitor General, Taft served as a judge on the
Superior Court of Ohio (1887-1890), a judge on the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals (1893-1900), and Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court (1921-1930).
18. SeeJUDITH IcKE ANDERSON, WILuAM HOWARD TAr: AN INTIMATE HISTORY
259 (1981); BRODERICK, supra note 11, at 26; BURTON, supra note 11, at 109-10, 197.
19. See BURTON, supra note 3, at 115; BURTON, supra note 11, at 118-19; DAVID
S. PATTERSON, TOWARD A WARLESS WORLD: THE TRAVAIL OF THE AMERICAN PEACE
MOVEMENT, 1887-1914, at 165 (1976). Elihu Root, Secretary of State during Taft's
presidency, held similar views. See Mary Ellen O'Connell, Arbitration and the Avoid-
ance of War: The Nineteenth-Century American Vision, in THE SWORD AND THE SCALES:
THE UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 30, 41 (Cesare
P.R. Romano ed., 2009).
20. See BURTON, supra note 11, at 107 (positing that societal progress derived
from impulses toward personal freedom and right to personal property, which law
could help uphold); WALTER V. SCHOLES & MARIE V. SCHOLES, THE FOREIGN POLI-
CIES OF THE TAFT ADMINISTRATION 247 (1970).
21. See BURTON, supra note 3 (exploring these themes).
538 [Vol. 56: p. 535
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tures to further the goal of an orderly international system, one should
build them.22
Fourth, and most fundamentally, Taft's effort to create arbitral struc-
tures fit squarely with the established social and religious views of the day.
In late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century America and Europe, a
rule-of-law movement promoting international courts and arbitral institu-
tions had gained much traction. Churches and popular peace societies
advocated international codification and international courts, viewing
these measures as alternatives to war. Significantly for Taft, it was not only
ordinary citizens who favored international courts and arbitral mecha-
nisms. American leaders did too. Taft was part of the establishment, and
he joined prominent businessmen, top lawyers, university presidents, and
ministers of major churches in supporting and directing international
rule-of-law organizations.23 Republicans, in particular, were dedicated to
advancing international peace through legal mechanisms.24
The start of the twentieth century was a period of great interest in
constructing mechanisms to enforce international law.25 Taft built on en-
thusiasm generated by nineteenth-century arbitrations, some of which,
such as the 1872 U.S.-U.K Alabama Claims arbitration,2 6 the 1905 U.K-
Russia Dogger Bank inquiry,27 and the 1909 France-Germany Casablanca ar-
bitration, 28 helped defuse sensitive, politicized disputes. Between 1795
and 1914, countries established over 200 arbitral tribunals, with the
United Kingdom and the United States creating many of them.29 More
than 120 bilateral arbitration treaties were concluded between 1900 and
1914 alone.3 0 The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 had insti-
tutionalized international arbitral mechanisms and proposed an Interna-
22. See FRNcIs ANTHONY BOYLE, FOUNDATIONS OF WORLD ORDER: THE LEGAL-
isT APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1896-1922, at 10-14 (1999); BURTON,
supra note 3, at 60; O'Connell, supra note 19.
23. SeeJANIs, supra note 12, at 144; PATTERSON, supra note 19, at 171-73; John
P. Campbell, Taft, Roosevelt, and the Arbitration Treaties of 1911, 53 J. AM. HisT. 279,
288 (1966).
24. See BOYLE, supra note 22, at 17.
25. SeeJANIs, supra note 12, at 144-57.
26. See id. at 131-34; Tom Bingham, The Alabama Claims Arbitration, 54 INT'L &
Comp. L.Q. 1 (2005); O'Connell, supra note 19, at 34-37.
27. Incident in the North Sea (The Dogger Bank Case) (Gr. Brit. v. Russ.),
Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) 403 (Comm'n of Inquiry 1905).
28. Case of Casablanca (Fr. v. Ger.), 11 R.I.A.A. 119 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1909); see
Robert A. Friedlander, Who Put Out the Lamps? Thoughts on International Law and
the Coming of World War I, 20 DuQ. L. REv. 569, 574-76 (1982).
29. See Nicholas Butler, Arbitration and Conciliation Treaties, in MAX PLANCK EN-
CYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw (Rfidiger Wolfrum ed.), available at
http://www.mpepil.com (last updated Aug. 2011); William Howard Taft, Address
at the First Annual Assemblage of the League to Enforce Peace, Washington, DC:
Constitutionality of the Proposals (May 26, 1916), in 7 COLLECTED WORKS, supra
note 9, at 55, 57.
30. SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURT: WHAT IT IS AND How IT WORKS 10
(5th rev. ed. 1995).
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tional Prize Court.3 ' Taft noted the many historical examples of binding
arbitrations and maintained that treaties providing for arbitration fell
within the treaty-making authority of the U.S. Constitution.32
The religious dimension of this international law project was critically
important. Before the Civil War, Christian utopians founded a peace
movement and sought to further its goals by promoting international
courts and tribunals of general jurisdiction. After the Civil War, and espe-
cially beginning in the 1880s, the religious community supported interna-
tional courts with renewed energy and provided Taft with his most
receptive audiences. Taft was Unitarian, but he shared with mainstream
Christians a belief that international legal mechanisms could contribute
significantly to a more peaceful and just world.3 3 In short, the Taft Arbi-
tration Treaties may be situated in the broader context of a purportedly
universal religious utopian movement. Many Europeans also favored
peace initiatives and formal international dispute settlement, providing
hope that American efforts to promote international arbitration would be
well-received abroad.
Proposals for international courts also followed a rule-of-law model
familiar to Americans. Indeed, for many in the peace movement, the U.S.
federal structure, including a Supreme Court able to decide interstate
controversies between U.S. states, provided an attractive template for in-
ternational legalization efforts. 34 Several leading U.S. academics and pub-
lic figures endorsed this view.35 The movement for international
arbitration and adjudication did not appear "foreign" to American observ-
ers. Instead, this movement built on U.S. experiences, including success-
ful international arbitrations, religious traditions, and legal structures.
Taft approached proposals for international arbitration in a conserva-
tive and practical fashion. He did not support the bolder disarmament
initiatives of the pacifist wing of the peace movement.3 6 In Taft's view, the
United States had to maintain military preparedness.3 7 Taft admitted his
31. See David D. Caron, War and International Adjudication: Reflections on the
1899 Peace Conference, 94 Am. J. INT'L L. 4 (2000).
32. TAFr, supra note 5, at 90-132.
33. See generally BURTON, supra note 11, at 135; R.B.C. Howell, Life and Times of
William Howard Taft, 17 TENN. L. REv. 281, 281-82 (1942); William Howard Taft,
Address at the Laying of the Cornerstone of the Universalist Church, Portland, OR
(Oct. 3, 1909), in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF WILLIAM HowARD TArr 252, 253
(David H. Burton ed., 2002). For a discussion of the influence of religion on the
American movement for peace, international law, and international courts, see
JANIs, supra note 12, at 42-91, 138-43.
34. See Caron, supra note 31, at 10; Taft, supra note 10, at 38-44.
35. See, e.g., BOYLE, supra note 22, at 25-26; Robert Lansing, Notes on World
Sovereignty, 15 AM. J. INT'L L. 13, 15, 19 (1921) (manuscript prepared in 1906);
John E. Noyes, Raleigh Colston Minor, in 15 AM. NAT'L BioGRAPHY 574 (John A.
Garraty & Mark C. Carnes eds., 1999).
36. See PATTERSON, supra note 19, at 166-69.
37. See BURTON, supra note 3, at 81, 93, 99.
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treaties would not guarantee a peaceful world and recognized that resort
to war, though undesirable, remained an option legal at international law.
Taft's conservatism also led him to work deliberately toward imple-
menting his vision of international tribunals empowered to help peace-
fully resolve disputes. In March 1910 he proposed bilateral arbitration
treaties with Britain and France, signing those two treaties in August 1911
and sending them to the Senate for its advice and consent. A grander
rule-of-law vision underlay Taft's effort to conclude the two treaties. Taft
and other proponents believed they would serve as models for other coun-
tries to make the same arrangements for binding arbitration. Germany
and Japan were frequently mentioned as future U.S. arbitration treaty
partners, and Taft hoped the Netherlands, Norway, Russia, and Sweden
would join the project as well.3 8 A web of bilateral arbitration treaties with
the United States was to be only the start of efforts to build a more peace-
ful world. Taft anticipated that this web would persuade pairs of Euro-
pean states to conclude such treaties.39 A permanent international court,
applying a code of international law, was the ultimate goal.40 Indeed, in-
terstate arbitrations fell short of a rule-of-law ideal: bilateral arbitral tribu-
nals, as opposed to one international court, might apply international law
inconsistently or be more prone to base their decisions on political accom-
modation, thus less assuredly furthering the cause of international peace
in accordance with the law.4 1 Taft likely would have preferred an interna-
tional court of general jurisdiction, but he thought it politically most feasi-
ble to begin by entering treaties with two Western allies, which shared
common values and historic ties with the United States.
Although Taft's proposed arbitration treaties represented a break
with the foreign policy of Theodore Roosevelt,42 Taft's immediate prede-
cessor as President, the treaties were not radical initiatives in the context
of American views about international law at the start of the twentieth cen-
tury. Part II looks more closely at the Taft Arbitration Treaties and the
debate they engendered. This debate and the ultimate fate of the treaties
reveal limits on the United States' enthusiasm for international legaliza-
tion projects, even during this period of history.
38. See PRINGLE, supra note 7, at 744.
39. See WILLIAM HowARD TArr, POPULAR GOVERNMENT: ITS ESSENCE, ITS PER-
MANENCE AND ITS PERILS 262 (1913) [hereinafter TAFr, POPULAR GOVERNMENT].
40. See BURTON, supra note 3, at 86; TArr, POPULAR GOVERNMENT, supra note
39, at 262; Editorial Comment, President Taft on International Peace, 5 AM. J. INT'L L.
718, 721 (1911). Indeed, more generally, Taft in his various foreign policy initia-
tives sought "a world-ordered diplomacy that would evolve naturally, leading even-
tually to an international organization whose purpose would be peace within the
community of nations." BURTON, supra note 3, at 60.
41. See Campbell, supra note 23, at 293; Edward Gordon, Legal Disputes Under
Article 36(2) of the Statute, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OFJUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS
183, 205-06 (Lori F. Damrosch ed., 1987).
42. See BURTON, supra note 3, at 64.
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II. THE TAFT ARBITRATION TREATIES AND THE DEBATE OVER
SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT 4 3
President Taft proposed his bilateral arbitration treaties in a speech
to the American Peace and Arbitration League on March 22, 1910.44 He
intended the treaties to replace 1908 U.S.-U.K. and U.S.-France bilateral
arbitration treaties.45 Those 1908 treaties were the end product of earlier
international legalization efforts. After the Senate failed to approve an
1897 general arbitration treaty with Britain, 46 the United States negotiated
a series of bilateral arbitration treaties in 1904 and 1905, known as the Hay
Arbitration Treaties after Secretary of State John Hay.47 The Hay Treaties
called for the Permanent Court of Arbitration to hear interstate disputes
referred to it by special agreement, but they did not extend to disputes
affecting "the vital interests, the independence, or the honor of the two
43. For contemporary views about the Taft Arbitration Treaties, see HENRY
CABOT LODGE, THE GENERAL ARBITRATION TREATIES WITH GREAT BRITAIN AND
FRANCE, S. Doc. No. 62-353 (2d Sess. 1912); PHILANDER C. KNox, THE PENDING
ARBITRATION TREATIES, S. Doc. No. 62-298 (2d Sess. 1911); S. Doc. No. 62-98 (1st
Sess. 1911); Am. Soc'Y FOR JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF INT'L DISPUTEs, PROCEEDINGS
OF SECOND NATIONAL CONFERENCE (James Brown Scott ed., 1911) (including
articles by Jacob Gould Schurman, John H. Latan6, O.F. Hershey, Philander C.
Knox, and John Temple Graves); William Cullen Dennis, The Arbitration Treaties
and the Senate Amendments, 6 Am. J. INT'L L. 614 (1912); William C. Dennis, The
Pending Arbitration Treaty with Great Britain, 60 U. PA. L. REv. 388 (1912); Editorial
Comment, The Pending Treaty ofArbitration Between the United States and Great Britain,
6 Am. J. INT'L L. 149, 167 (1912); Third Session, 6 AM. SOC'v INT'L L. PROC. 87
(1912) (including papers by George Turner and Richard Olney and comments by
Theodore Marburg and William C. Dennis); Editorial Comment, The Treaties of
Arbitration with Great Britain and France, 6 Am. J. INT'L L. 460 (1912). For Taft's own
analysis, see, e.g., TAFr, supra note 5, at 90-132.
For later accounts, see PATTERSON, supra note 19, at 169-80; PRINGLE, supra
note 7, at 738-55; Campbell, supra note 23; RobertJ. Fischer, Henry Cabot Lodge and
the Taft Arbitration Treaties, 78 So. ATLANTIC Q. 244 (1979); E. James Hindman, The
General Arbitration Treaties of William Howard Taft, 36 THE HISTORIAN 52 (1973);
John E. Noyes, Taft Arbitration Treaties (1911), in MAx PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 29; Hans-Jfirgen Schlochauer, Taft
Arbitration Treaties (1911), in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 751 (R.
Bernhard ed., 1996).
44. See PATTERSON, supra note 19, at 169; PRINGLE, supra note 7, at 738-39; Taft
Is for Peace with Reservations, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1910, at 1.
45. Arbitration Convention, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Apr. 4, 1908, 35 Stat. 1960; Con-
vention for Settlement of Disputes by Arbitration, U.S.-Fr., Feb. 10, 1908, 35 Stat.
1925.
46. The U.S. Senate failed by three votes to provide the two-thirds margin
necessary for its advice and consent to the 1897 Olney-Pauncefort general arbitra-
tion treaty with Britain. Arbitration Treaty, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Jan. 11, 1897, S. Doc.
No. 58-161 (3d Sess. 1905); see PATTERSON, supra note 19, at 28-29, 36-47; Michael
Blakeney, The Olney-Pauncefort Treaty of 1897-The Failure of Anglo-American General
Arbitration, 8 ANGLO-AM. L. REv. 175 (1979).
47. The United States based the Hay Treaties on a 1903 France-U.K treaty.
Agreement for the Settlement by Arbitration of Certain Classes of Questions
Which May Arise Between the Two Governments, Fr.-Gr. Brit., Oct. 14, 1903, 194
Consol. T.S. 194; see BOYLE, supra note 22, at 31-32.
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Contracting States."48 President Theodore Roosevelt refused to ratify the
Hay Treaties when the Senate insisted on consenting to the arbitration of
each dispute, a change that, in Roosevelt's view, turned the obligation to
arbitrate into an empty "agreement to agree."4 9 However, Roosevelt re-
versed his opposition, and the United States, in 1908-1909, ratified twenty-
two bilateral arbitration treaties (the Root Treaties) that were substantially
identical to the Hay Treaties as modified by the Senate; the 1908 treaties
with France and the United Kingdom were two of the twenty-two.5 0
As negotiated by U.S. Secretary of State Philander C. Knox and signed
on August 3, 1911, the Taft Arbitration Treaties-sometimes called the
Knox Arbitration Treaties-contained three significant features. First,
they did not, as had the 1908 treaties, exempt matters affecting vital inter-
ests or national honor. They applied to "[a]ll differences hereafter arising
between" the parties, not settled by diplomatic means, "relating to interna-
tional matters in which the high contracting parties are concerned by vir-
tue of a claim of right made by one against the other under treaty or
otherwise . .. and which are justiciable in their nature."5
48. E.g., Arbitration Convention, U.S.-Port., art. I, Nov. 23, 1904, 3 UN-
PERFECTED TREATIES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 1776-1976, at 487, 488
(Christian L. Wiktor ed., 1977).
49. Taft on Treaty Making Urges Executive Right, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1905; accord
PATTERSON, supra note 19, at 126-27; Ronald F. Reter, President Theodore Roosevelt
and the Senate's "Advice and Consent" to Treaties, 44 THE HISTORIAN 483, 492-95
(1982).
50. Arbitration Convention, U.S.-Para., Mar. 13, 1909, 36 Stat. 2190; Arbitra-
tion Convention, U.S.-Braz., Jan. 23, 1909, 37 Stat. 1535; Arbitration Convention,
U.S.-Austria-Hung.,Jan. 15, 1909, 36 Stat. 2156; Arbitration Convention, U.S.-Costa
Rica, Jan. 13, 1909, 36 Stat. 2175; Arbitration Convention, U.S.-Uru.,Jan. 9, 1909,
38 Stat. 1741; Arbitration Convention, U.S.-Ecuador, Jan. 7, 1909, 36 Stat. 2456;
Arbitration Convention, U.S.-Haiti,Jan. 7, 1909, 36 Stat. 2193; Arbitration Conven-
tion, U.S.-El Sal., Dec. 21, 1908, 36 Stat. 2172; Arbitration Convention, U.S.-Peru,
Dec. 5, 1908, 36 Stat. 2169; Arbitration Convention, U.S.-China, Oct. 8, 1908, 36
Stat. 2154; Arbitration Convention, U.S.-Den., May 18, 1908, 36 Stat. 2151; Conven-
tion for Settlement of Disputes by Arbitration, U.S.-Japan, May 5, 1908, 35 Stat.
2050; Arbitration Convention, U.S.-Neth., May 2, 1908, 36 Stat. 2148; Convention
for Settlement of Disputes by Arbitration, U.S.-Swed., May 2, 1908, 35 Stat. 2047;
Arbitration Convention, U.S.-Spain, Apr. 20, 1908, 35 Stat. 1957; Arbitration Con-
vention, U.S.-Port., Apr. 6, 1908, 35 Stat. 2085; Arbitration Convention, U.S.-Gr.
Brit., supra note 45; Convention for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes, U.S.-Nor.,
Apr. 4, 1908, 35 Stat. 1994; Arbitration Convention, U.S.-It., Mar. 28, 1908, 35 Stat.
2091; Convention for the Purpose of Pacific Settlement of Disputes, U.S.-Mex.,
Mar. 24, 1908, 35 Stat. 1997; Arbitration Convention, U.S.-Switz., Feb. 29, 1908, 35
Stat. 2088; Convention for Settlement of Disputes by Arbitration, U.S.-Fr., supra
note 45; see S. Doc. No. 62-98 (1st Sess. 1911); BOYLE, sup-a note 22, at 31-34;
PATTERSON, supra note 19, at 128.
51. Taft Arbitration Treaties, supra note 2, art. I. The earlier 1908 treaties
referred to "differences . . . of a legal nature" rather than to claims of right. See,
e.g., Arbitration Convention, U.S.-Gr. Brit., supra note 45, art. 1; Convention for
Settlement of Disputes by Arbitration, U.S.-Fr., supra note 45, art. I.
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Second, the treaties explicitly invoked equity. An international dis-
pute was deemed "justiciable" if it was "susceptible of decision by the appli-
cation of the principles of law or equity."52
A third notable feature of the Taft Arbitration Treaties was their insti-
tutional mechanism for settling disagreements over whether a difference
was subject to arbitration. If the parties disagreed about the justiciability
of a dispute, a Joint High Commission of Inquiry would consider the mat-
ter. Each party was to designate three of its nationals to serve on the Com-
mission, which would operate pursuant to Articles 9-36 of the 1907 Hague
Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.5 3 Under
Article 111(3) of the treaties, if five or six commissioners determined that a
dispute was justiciable, it would "be referred to arbitration in accordance
with" the treaty's provisions. These provisions required the parties to con-
clude a special agreement "in each case," referring the matter either to the
Permanent Court of Arbitration or to another party-designated arbitral tri-
bunal.5 4 In considering such special agreements, the Senate would thus
have a say in specifying details concerning each arbitration, but many Sen-
ators concluded that the Senate could not override a Commission deter-
mination that a controversy was arbitrable.5 5
The treaties also accorded the Joint High Commission of Inquiry ad-
ditional dispute settlement roles. Either party could refer any controversy
to the Commission for investigation. The Commission's investigative au-
thority encompassed justiciable controversies prior to their submission to
arbitration, as well as other, non-justiciable controversies.5 6 When the
Commission investigated a matter, it could not render a binding decision.
Rather, it could "examine into and report upon the particular questions
or matters referred to it, for the purpose of facilitating the solution of
disputes by elucidating the facts," "define the issues presented by such
questions," and make "appropriate" recommendations.5 7
What were the main arguments for and against the Taft Arbitration
Treaties, and why were they not ratified? Some political factors undoubt-
edly contributed to the Senate's difficulties with the treaties. Historians
52. Taft Arbitration Treaties, supra note 2, art. I.
53. The parties could agree to modify the Commission's composition or pro-
cedures. Id. art. II.
54. Id. art. I.
55. See TAFT, supra note 5, at 109-10; Campbell, supra note 23, at 282; Fischer,
supra note 43, at 255-56. But see Mr. Knox on the Treaties, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1911
(Secretary of State Knox arguing that Senate would retain "unimpaired powers"
even after Commission decision that matter was justiciable). President Taft and his
Secretary of State sometimes disagreed about how to interpret the arbitration trea-
ties. See PATTERSON, supra note 19, at 177-78.
56. Taft Arbitration Treaties, supra note 2, art. II. Either party could post-
pone for a year the reference of a dispute to the Commission, in order to allow
diplomatic discussion and negotiation. Id.
57. Id. art. III. For discussion of the roles of international commissions of
inquiry, see J.G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DisPUTE SETrLEMENT 45-63 (4th ed.
2005).
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have noted that Taft lacked political skill in dealing with Congress and
that he failed to consult sufficiently with Senate leaders before presenting
the Senate with the signed treaties.5 8 Some German-Americans and Irish-
Americans objected to the U.S.-France and U.S.-U.K. initiatives.5 9 Taft
perceived that success with the treaties might lead to political gains on
other fronts,6 0 and Democrats resisted giving the Republican President a
Senate victory in the year leading up to a presidential election.61 But the
debate over the treaties also revealed that proponents and opponents of
the Taft Arbitration Treaties held fundamentally different views about the
value of legalizing international relations through recourse to formal
third-party dispute settlement.
President Taft toured the country to campaign for his arbitration trea-
ties. The treaties were popular, and Taft's arguments resonated, sug-
gesting how favorably many Americans viewed international law and legal
process at the time.6 2 Taft asserted arbitrators could and would apply in-
ternational law honorably and fairly. He regularly and publicly acknowl-
edged that the United States might lose some cases-even important
cases, since the treaties did not exempt matters of vital national interest or
national honor. "We cannot make an omelet without breaking eggs," he
said, and "[w]e cannot submit international questions to arbitration with-
out the prospect of losing."6 s But that was fine, according to Taft, because
the alternative to solving a dispute peacefully could well be war, expensive
and horrific, or a never-ending arms race, itself expensive and quite possi-
bly making war more likely.
Although fact-finding commissions of inquiry could be useful in set-
tling some disputes, Taft, leaders of the "international peace and courts"
movement, and much of the public saw arbitration and war as the two
main alternatives when states could not settle important differences diplo-
matically. How exactly would arbitration prevent war? Some arguments
made by proponents lacked nuance, relying on a view of countries behav-
ing like individuals: dueling was outlawed; individuals now used legal
mechanisms to settle their disputes peacefully; countries could and should
58. See ANDERSON, supra note 18, at 133, 192-93; SCHOLES & SCHOLES, Supra
note 20, at 10 & n.18. Professor Peri Arnold thoughtfully argues that Taft's mani-
fest successes in his pre-presidential career, where he held positions that required
him to carry our specified mandates, did not prepare him with the skills he would
need to become a successful President. See PERI E. ARNOLD, REMAKING THE PRESI-
DENCv- ROOSEVELT, TAFT, AND WILSON 71-99 (2009).
59. See Fischer, supra note 43, at 249; Hindman, supra note 43, at 60.
60. See Burr, supra note 13, at 635; PATTERSON, supra note 19, at 178-79; see
also Bu-rr, supra note 13, at 612, 732 (noting Taft's willingness to forfeit political
gains on other issues in order to secure approval of treaties).
61. See PATTERSON, supra note 19, at 178; Fischer, supra note 43, at 249; Hind-
man, supra note 43, at 64.
62. See BARTLETr, supra note 10; PATTERSON, supra note 6, at 170; PRINGLE,
supra note 7, at 753; Campbell, supra note 23, at 280-81.
63. Taft Intimates Appeal to People, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1911.
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follow a similar path. 64 Taft and other treaty proponents also made addi-
tional arguments. Arbitration would lead to reasoned, fair decisions that
states, committed to the rule of law, would implement. It was thus impor-
tant that states accepting the arbitration treaties have a tradition of respect
for law. 65 Arbitration also could serve the practical function of providing
time for tensions to cool. 66
Taft never ratified the arbitration treaties, because the Senate gave its
advice and consent to them with what he saw as crippling changes. Oppo-
nents focused on two features of the treaties: the language governing jus-
ticiability and the treaties' failure to make exceptions for politically
sensitive issues. More broadly, the debate revealed the contours of the
disagreement about when it was appropriate to allow third-party tribunals
to hear international legal disputes.
First, opponents objected to the provisions of the Taft treaties that
were to determine whether particular differences were justiciable-that is,
to quote the treaties, "susceptible of decision by the application of the
principles of law or equity."6 7 Treaty critics wanted to remove Article
111(3), which allowed the Joint High Commission to decide justiciability.
Without that clause, the Senate retained discretion to determine jus-
ticiability, able to approve or reject a special agreement providing for arbi-
tration on a case-by-case basis.68
The debate over Article 111(3) was often framed in constitutional
terms. Treaty opponents argued that the Senate could not constitutionally
"delegate" its responsibilities concerning treaties to an international com-
mission.69 For Taft, the constitutional delegation objection was without
merit. He forcefully and persuasively rejected it, invoking sovereignty and
precedent. As a sovereign nation, Taft said, the United States "may, ....
through its treaty-making power, consent to any agreement with other
powers relating to subject matter that is ... made the subject of treaties."70
In dozens of previous arbitrations in which the United States had partici-
pated, "it was never suggested that the Government was delegating any
64. See PRINGLE, supra note 7, at 750; Tells Taft's Work for World Peace, N.Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 3, 1911.
65. See TAFr, POPULAR GOVERNMENT, supra note 39, at 258, 263 (noting need
for parties to have "well-ordered and just governments" reflecting "proper
authority").
66. See Caron, supra note 31, at 7-8; Leo Gross, The International Court ofJustice:
Consideration of Requirements for Enhancing Its Role in the International Legal Order, in
THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OFJUSTICE 24 (1976); Taft on Peace and
Politics, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 20, 1911, at 1; supra note 55 and accompanying text.
67. Taft Arbitration Treaties, supra note 2, art. 1.
68. Taft had initially favored authorizing an arbitral tribunal to determine on
its own which matters were arbitrable, but he concluded that the treaties would
gain political support by incorporating the supermajority procedure of the Joint
High Commission. See PRINGLE, supra note 7, at 746.
69. See S. REP. No. 62-98 (1st Sess. 1911).
70. Taft, supra note 29, at 56 (citing Geoffrey v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1889)).
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power at all to the tribunal."7 ' Agreements to arbitrate "questions which
had not yet arisen described only by definition and classification"
presented no new constitutional delegation concerns.7 2 By giving its ad-
vice and consent to the Hague International Prize Court Convention,73
Taft noted, the Senate had recognized the legality even of agreements al-
lowing an international court or tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction.7 4
The constitutional challenge to the Taft Arbitration Treaties likely re-
flected many Senators' views that the Senate "should" be directly involved
in deciding whether to arbitrate each particular international dispute.
Opponents of the Taft Arbitration Treaties also criticized the vague-
ness of the "susceptible of decision by the application of the principles of
law or equity" standard the Joint High Commission would use to deter-
mine justiciability.75 Taft responded that the jurisprudence of the U.S.
Supreme Court determining the justiciability of disputes between U.S.
states provided helpful standards. As the Supreme Court had indicated,
disputes between U.S. states were essentially like disputes between coun-
tries.7 6 Taft thought it clear that some matters, such as the right of a coun-
try to self-preservation, were non-justiciable.7 7 Furthermore, numerous
international arbitrations had successfully proceeded under mandates au-
thorizing, inter alia, recourse to equity, thus providing international prac-
tice that would have informed the commissioners.7 8 In the end, however,
the Senate accepted the opposition point of view, voting forty-two to forty
71. Id. at 57.
72. Id.; accord 5 Hackworth DIGEST § 471, at 67-68.
73. Hague Convention (No. XII) Relative to the Creation of an International
Prize Court, Oct. 18, 1907, 205 Consol. T.S. 381 (not in force).
74. See Taft, supra note 29, at 57-58. The United Kingdom did not accept the
International Prize Court, and the United States never proceeded with this Con-
vention. For an introduction to the Prize Convention, see BOYLE, supra note 22, at
59-64.
75. See S. REP. No. 62-98 (1st Sess. 1911). For an excellent account of various
historical efforts to specify the meaning of "justiciable disputes," see Gordon, supra
note 41.
76. See TAr, supra note 5, at 157-61.
77. See PRINGLE, supra note 7, at 745; TArr, supra note 5, at 103-07, 123-24.
Taft himself was not entirely consistent in his pronouncements about whether cer-
tain classes of politically sensitive cases would be found justiciable. See Fischer,
supra note 43, at 250.
78. See Dennis, Pending Arbitration with Great Britain, supra note 43, at 398-99
(collecting sources); Taft, supra note 29, at 56-57. Treaty opponents particularly
objected to the reference to equity in the proposed U.S.-France Treaty, since
France did not share the Anglo-American system of equity. However, as used in
international arbitration agreements, the term "equity" referred to "general ideas
common to humanity but not reduced to the condition of working rules." J.H.
RALSTON, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS FROM ATHENS To LocARNo 16 (1929). Taft
stressed that the phrase "law or equity" should be read as a whole, with equity
being used when necessary to "mitigate[ I the severity of the law" and "reach []
justice." TArr, supra note 5, at 107-08. In short, "equity" in the Taft Treaties' jus-




to cut Article 111(3) of the two treaties, thus removing the authority of the
Joint High Commission to decide justiciability. Without Article 111(3), the
treaties allowed the Senate to determine justiciability itself, on a case-by-
case basis.
The opposition raised a second, predictable point: the treaties should
make some exceptions for matters affecting national honor or vital na-
tional interests. Taft believed such exceptions would be dangerous:
Questions of national honor and of vital interest include all those
questions, the agitation of which is likely to lead to war, and,
therefore, arbitration treaties which except such questions may
be said to be treaties for the settlement of those questions that
never would involve war in their settlement anyhow.7 9
Where vital national interests were involved, in other words, Taft thought
arbitration could be most useful. He noted that the United States and
other countries had a good track record of settling major disputes peace-
fully, as in the 1872 Alabama Claims arbitration. Also, Taft said, the catego-
ries of "vital interest" or "national honor" were too likely to be
manipulated. Almost anything could be characterized as a "vital interest,"
so excepting those categories could let a country avoid arbitration at
will.80
Many Senators disagreed with the idea of submitting matters of vital
national interest to binding international arbitration. 8' They thought
Taft's legalistic approach would inappropriately constrain U.S. flexibility
and proposed exempting some sensitive disputes from the scope of the
treaties. The exemptions concerned disputes over: the Monroe Doctrine
"or other purely governmental policy"; the admission of "aliens" into the
United States or into U.S. state educational institutions; the repayment of
bonds owed by U.S. states; and the "territorial integrity" of the United
States.8 2 In general, most Senators disagreed with the view that the trea-
ties should cover all sensitive justiciable disputes. The proposal to add the
exemptions to the Taft Arbitration Treaties passed, forty-six to thirty-six.
Taft's opponents also raised other arguments, which broadly reflected
strands of U.S. foreign policy that viewed "foreign entanglements" with
skepticism and that sought to preserve unilateral U.S. freedom of action,
particularly in the Western Hemisphere. Some treaty opponents thought
79. TArr, PoPuLAR GOVERNMENT, supra note 39, at 261.
80. TArr, supra note 5, at 99-100; accord Gordon, supra note 41, at 208-09.
81. See, e.g., Fischer, supra note 43 (recognizing Senator Henry Cabot Lodge
as leading opponent).
82. See, e.g., TAFr, supra note 5, at 117-26; Fischer, supra note 43. It is not clear
that all the exceptions were necessary to satisfy the concerns of treaty opponents.
For example, the exemption relating to repayment of bonds was a concern of sena-
tors from southern states that owed debts on bonds, but the Taft Arbitration Trea-
ties provided that only disputes "hereafter arising," not disputes related to events
arising prior to the conclusion of the treaties, would be subject to arbitration. Taft
Arbitration Treaties, supra note 2, art. I.
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there would probably be more complaints against the United States than
the other way around, making the arbitral playing field uneven. They saw
the legal standards that an arbitral tribunal would apply as too indetermi-
nate,8 3 and feared that international tribunals might not be impartial. 4
Not all observers relished the prospect of peaceful resolution of disputes
in accordance with the law, arguing that the United States should preserve
the option to use force, especially on matters of vital interest. Theodore
Roosevelt, who opposed the Taft treaties, advocated "righteousness over
peace." Roosevelt and a few other high-profile opponents, including Ad-
miral Alfred Thayer Mahan, voiced anti-legalist themes: the importance of
upholding national prestige and power and of furthering "manly" national
goals regardless of legal objections.8 5
Taft resolutely sought to advance the arbitration treaties. He re-
mained unpersuaded by arguments questioning the wisdom of arbitral
tribunals authorized to judge the legality of U.S. and foreign actions. For
Taft, the opponents' arguments amounted to "the doctrine of despair," 6
a distressing rejection of the valuable role of international legal process in
helping settle international disputes peacefully.87
By a vote of seventy-six to three, the Senate eventually approved the
Taft Arbitration Treaties with the amendments exempting particular sub-
ject matters and deleting Article 111(3) (thereby removing any role for the
Joint High Commission in deciding justiciability). Taft refused to ratify
the treaties. He thought the Senate had "crippled,"8 8 "maimed,"89 "trun-
cated,"9 0 and "emasculated"9 1 them, leaving them in a form that even
"their own father could not recognize."92 Taft maintained he had
planned to resubmit the treaties to the Senate after the people had re-
placed some senators in the 1912 election, but instead, he noted, the vot-
ers decided to replace him.93
83. See PRINGLE, supra note 7, at 746.
84. See Gordon, supra note 41, at 206-07; William Howard Taft, Address at the
Metropolitan Opera House: The Paris Covenant for a League of Nations (Mar. 4,
1919), in 7 COLLECTED WORKs, supra note 9, at 241, 241-42.
85. See BARTLETT, supra note 10, at 20-21; PRINGLE, supra note 7, at 743-44;
Campbell, supra note 23, at 295-96; Fischer, supra note 43, at 258; Roosevelt Assails
the Taft Treaties, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1911; see also LODGE, supra note 43.
86. Taft, supra note 84, at 242.
87. See TArr, PomuiR GOVERNMENT, supra note 39, at 266.
88. William Howard Taft, Address at Montclair, NJ: The League: Why and
How (Dec. 30, 1918), in 7 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 9, at 165, 166.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Taft, supra note 84, at 241.




III. THE TAFT ARBITRATION TREATIES AND THE LEGALIZATION
OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
The Taft Arbitration Treaties represented an effort to legalize inter-
national relations. The treaties, although not radical in the context of
1911, did expand on previous bilateral efforts to provide for an interstate
arbitral mechanism that would be ready to operate when a dispute arose.
The popular treaties met with opposition; as discussed in Part II, the U.S.
Senate sought to approve arbitrations on a case-by-case basis and to ex-
empt certain sensitive issues from the scope of arbitrations. Nonetheless,
many prominent Americans, including President Taft, viewed with opti-
mism the development of international law to solve international disputes
and help insure a more peaceful world. As Professor Mark Janis has per-
suasively demonstrated, influential U.S. churches and peace societies, op-
erating both before and after the Civil War, "deeply influenced" late
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century American leaders, persuading
them "that the law of nations was fundamentally a good thing"9 4 and
prompting "great expectations ... for public international arbitration as
an alternative to war."95
Optimism about international third-party dispute settlement did not
dissipate immediately following Taft's defeat in his 1912 reelection bid.
The United States accepted a series of bilateral dispute settlement treaties
soon after the Senate refused to approve the Taft Arbitration Treaties in
the form Taft had submitted them. During 1913-1914, William Jennings
Bryan, Secretary of State in Woodrow Wilson's Administration, negotiated
over two dozen dispute settlement treaties with various countries, includ-
ing from Latin America; twenty-two were ratified.96 The Bryan Treaties
94. JANIs, supra note 12, at 91.
95. Id. at 148.
96. Treaty for the Advancement of Peace, U.S.-Ecuador, Oct. 13, 1914, 39
Stat. 1650; Treaty for the Advancement of Peace, U.S.-Swed., Oct. 13, 1914, 38 Stat.
1872; Treaty for the Advancement of Peace, U.S.-Russ., Sept. 18-Oct. 1, 1914, 39
Stat. 1622; Treaty for the Advancement of Peace, U.S.-China, Sept. 15, 1914, 39
Stat. 1642; Treaty for the Advancement of Peace, U.S.-Fr., Sept. 15, 1914, 38 Stat.
1887; Treaty for the Advancement of Peace, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Sept. 15, 1914, 38 Stat.
1853; Treaty for the Advancement of Peace, U.S.-Spain, Sept. 15, 1914, 38 Stat.
1862; Treaty for the Advancement of Peace, U.S.-Para., Aug. 29, 1914, 39 Stat.
1615; Treaty for the Advancement of Peace, U.S.-Braz., July 24, 1914, 39 Stat. 1698;
Treaty for the Advancement of Peace, U.S.-Chile, July 24, 1914, 39 Stat. 1645;
Treaty for the Advancement of Peace, U.S.-Uru., July 20, 1914, 38 Stat. 1908;
Treaty for the Advancement of Peace, U.S.-Peru, July 14, 1914, 39 Stat. 1611;
Treaty for the Advancement of Peace, U.S.-Nor., June 24, 1914, 38 Stat. 1843;
Treaty for the Advancement of Peace, U.S.-It., May 5, 1914, 39 Stat. 1618; Treaty
for the Advancement of Peace, U.S.-Den., Apr. 17, 1914, 38 Stat. 1883; Treaty for
the Advancement of Peace, U.S.-Venez., Mar. 21, 1914, 42 Stat. 1920; Treaty for the
Advancement of Peace, U.S.-Costa Rica, Feb. 13, 1914, 38 Stat. 1856; Treaty for the
Advancement of Peace, U.S.-Port., Feb. 4, 1914, 38 Stat. 1847; Treaty for the Ad-
vancement of Peace, U.S.-Bol.,Jan. 22, 1914, 38 Stat. 1868; Treaty for the Advance-
ment of Peace, U.S.-Neth., Dec. 18, 1913, 45 Stat. 2462; Treaty for the
Advancement of Peace, U.S.-Hond., Nov. 3, 1913, 39 Stat. 1672; Treaty for the
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did not authorize binding interstate arbitrations. Instead, they built on
the fact-finding mechanism of the Joint High Commission proposed in the
Taft Arbitration Treaties. The Bryan Treaties established conciliation
commissions to hear disputes that could not be settled by diplomatic
means or by arbitration. Commission investigations were intended to pro-
vide a "cooling off period" to defuse tensions, and the commissions could
render only non-binding recommendations.9 7 Because the recommenda-
tions were non-binding, the subject matters that the commissions could
consider were not subject to exemptions. The Bryan Treaties supple-
mented arbitration treaties such as the 1908-1909 Root Treaties.9 8 For a
pair of states accepting both a Root Treaty and a Bryan Treaty, every cate-
gory of international dispute was subject either to arbitration or to a non-
binding third-party international dispute settlement procedure.9 9
Efforts to promote a permanent international court continued as
well, backed by prominent peace advocates and international lawyers, in-
cluding those involved with Taft's League to Enforce Peace. For many,
the goal was an international court, which would replace the need for gen-
eral arbitration treaties.1 00 Not everyone, however, was enthusiastic: dur-
ing this period, some Americans opposed U.S. submission to the
obligatory jurisdiction of international courts authorized to issue binding
rulings on questions of international law. Indeed, the United States re-
jected participation in the Central American Court of Justice, formed in
1907, and, following World War I, the country refused to join the League
of Nations or separately to accept the Statute of the PCIJ.1 01 Still, it may
not be too much of a stretch to hypothesize that a bit more political skill
or flexibility on the part of Presidents Taft and Wilson might have led to
different results. Had Taft first built a consensus with Senate leaders, and
had he negotiated his arbitration treaties with France and the United
Kingdom on those consensus terms, it seems likely that the United States
would have accepted the treaties. 102 Historians have suggested that had
President Wilson accepted various Republican reservations to the Cove-
nant of the League of Nations, the United States might well, at the end of
World War I, have joined the League and participated in cases before the
PCIJ.103
Advancement of Peace, U.S.-Guat., Sept. 20, 1913, 38 Stat. 1840; see BOYLE, supra
note 22, at 124-26; Hans-Jtirgen Schlochauer, Bryan Treaties (1913-14), in MAx
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 29.
97. Articles 12 and 15 of the Covenant of the League of Nations also incorpo-
rated techniques of institutional investigation of disputes and a "cooling off pe-
riod" before states could take further actions that might escalate tensions.
98. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
99. See BOYLE, supfa note 22, at 125.
100. See, e.g., O'Connell, supra note 19, at 44.
101. See BOYLE, supra note 22, at 47-54.
102. See PATTERSON, supra note 19, at 174-75.
103. See ARNOLD, supra note 58, at 140. However, it is far from certain that the
United States, which by the 1920s was approaching great power status, would have
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One may fairly ask whether stronger U.S. arbitration treaties or U.S.
participation in the PCIJ would have made any significant difference to
the course of history. The point may be debated, and the answer must of
course remain speculative, but there are reasons for skepticism. The Brit-
ish and French were willing to appease other states in the new institutional
setting of the League, and it is questionable whether U.S. participation in
the League or in PCIJ cases would have affected many international dis-
putes. In highly politicized twentieth-century cases before the Interna-
tional Court ofJustice (ICJ), the successor to the PCIJ, parties accused of
acting illegally have simply refused to appear, and the decisions in those
cases appear to have contributed only marginally, if at all, to resolving the
disputes at issue.104 Furthermore, the procedures of international arbitral
tribunals, the PCIJ, and the ICJ have not accommodated full consideration
of the interests of third parties or the international community.10 5 It has
proved difficult to satisfactorily resolve highly politicized modern disputes
through international judicial process.
From the distance of a century, Taft's efforts to promote his arbitra-
tion treaties may appear naively optimistic. Global international legal in-
stitutions, including the PCIJ and the ICJ, have not prevented horrendous
wars. Today, the functions of international courts and tribunals, and of
compromissory clauses in treaties, are varied and nuanced. 0 6 It is not
that international courts and tribunals do not play important roles; their
proliferation suggests that states, individuals, and other international ac-
tors find them useful. 107 But the view that international arbitration or an
international court can assure the peaceful settlement of disputes between
rival states has largely disappeared. In the words of Professor David
Caron, " [w] hile contemporary observers are likely to believe that adjudica-
accepted the optional clause (compulsory) jurisdiction of the Permanent Court.
See MICHLA POMERANCE, THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD COURT AS A "SUPREME
COURT OF THE NATIONS": DREAMS, ILLUSIONS AND DISILLUSION 80-81 (1996).
104. See, e.g., Mark W. Janis, Somber Reflections on the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the
International Court, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 144 (1987).
105. See CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THIRD PARTIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 147-217,
247-88 (1993).
106. See RIcHARD B. BILDER, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND THE
ROLE OF ADJUDICATION (1986); YUvAL SHANY, THE COMPETING JURISDICTIONS OF IN-
TERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (2003); Karen J. Alter, Delegating to Interna-
tional Courts: Self-Binding vs. Other-Binding Delegation, 71 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Winter 2008, at 37; David D. Caron, Towards a Political Theory of International Courts
and Tribunals, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 401 (2006); John E. Noyes, The Functions of
Compromissory Clauses in U.S. Treaties, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 831 (1994).
107. The United States participates in several significant formal third-party
dispute settlement arrangements established by multilateral treaties. See, e.g.,
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation
and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, Dec.
4, 1995, 2167 U.N.T.S. 88; [World Trade Organization] Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869
U.N.T.S. 401.
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tion and mediation may facilitate the resolution of disputes between par-
ties that genuinely wish to avoid conflict, these same observers would
probably find it difficult to recreate the profound and widespread nine-
teenth-century faith in the peacekeeping ability of an international
court."' 08
As John Murphy has so ably explored, the world faces rule-of-law chal-
lenges far different from those of 1911.109 Bilateral interstate arbitration
treaties appear ill-suited to address the multilateral challenges posed by
global terrorism, nuclear proliferation, gross human rights abuses, or cli-
mate change. International law itself has changed, now encompassing
some matters, such as recourse to force, that many early twentieth-century
international lawyers would have regarded as completely within the discre-
tion of states.110 International legal disputes also are now less likely to be
perceived in state-centric terms than they were a century ago; a wide vari-
ety of non-state entities-including individuals, corporations, and interna-
tional institutions-have international legal rights and responsibilities."'
The Taft Arbitration Treaties provided for jurisdiction over pairs of states,
but not over non-state actors. General bilateral arbitration treaties-even
a web of them-seem unlikely to provide effective solutions for many
modern international problems. For a host of reasons, no one is going to
start a centennial campaign to bring back the Taft Arbitration Treaties.
The Taft Arbitration Treaties nevertheless suggest questions about
twenty-first-century efforts to legalize international relations. First, how
can we identify and foster shared perspectives, which seem essential in
addressing problems of peace, security, human rights, and the environ-
ment? The notion of "shared perspectives" helps explain why the Taft Ar-
bitration Treaties attracted as much support as they did. America had
cultural and historical ties with France and the United Kingdom. Taft
stressed the importance of concluding arbitration treaties with countries
sharing a tradition of respect for law and legal institutions.1 2 A common
108. Caron, supra note 31, at 8-9. "[T]oday the international community, at
least as regards the use of force, expects less from the machinery of interstate adju-
dication. It is not viewed with the same unbridled expectations." Id. at 24.
109. SeeJoHN F. MURPHY, THE EVOLVING DIMENSIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2010); JOHN F. MURPHY, THE UNITED STATES AND THE RULE OF LAW IN INTERNA-
TIONAL AFFAIRS (2004).
110. See WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW § 16, at
64-65 (London, Clarendon Press 1895). Recall that Taft considered matters re-
lated to national survival as non-justiciable, thus not falling within the scope of his
arbitration treaties. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
111. This change is a matter of degree, depending in part on the forum, the
issue, and particular decision makers' jurisprudential perspectives. Even at the
high point of state-centric positivism, some forums acknowledged the international
legal rights of some non-state actors. See Mark W. Janis, Individuals as Subjects of
International Law, 17 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 61 (1984); Jordan J. Paust, Nonstate Actor
Participation in International Law and the Pretense of Exclusion, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 977
(2011).
112. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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religious tradition also provided impetus behind the Taft Arbitration Trea-
ties, for many viewed the treaties as furthering Christian utopian goals.
Today, it seems essential to identify, develop, and strengthen common
perspectives and values if we are to provide a solid foundation for impor-
tant international legal initiatives. Perhaps international law regimes
themselves may contribute to identifying and fostering shared values and
perspectives.1 13
For those not content with a modest view of the potential contribu-
tions of international law and institutions-contributions limited to tech-
nical, "realistic" cooperation regimes-Taft's efforts pose a second
question: Is it helpful to articulate and pursue a utopian vision in order to
structure actions, including international law initiatives? William Howard
Taft was a practical politician, but his advocacy of the Taft Arbitration
Treaties, his later leadership of the League to Enforce Peace, and his sup-
port for the League of Nations suggest he was motivated by such a vision.
Taft sought a stable, ordered world in which legal institutions-ultimately,
an international court-would substitute peaceful dispute settlement for
war, a world in which economic development and justice could flourish.
I applaud John Murphy for tackling the big issues, for recognizing the
importance of the rule of law in international affairs, and for so cogently
analyzing modern challenges to that rule of law.
113. See generallyJutta Brunnde & StephenJ. Toope, International Law and Con-
structivism: Elements of an Interactional Theory of International Law, 39 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 19 (2000).
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APPENDIX
GENERAL ARBITRATION TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN
AND THE UNITED STATES
Signed at Washington, August 3, 1911
The United States of America and His Majesty the King of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions be-
yond the Seas, Emperor of India, being equally desirous of perpetuating
the peace, which has happily existed between the two nations, as estab-
lished in 1814 by the Treaty of Ghent, and has never since been inter-
rupted by an appeal to arms, and which has been confirmed and
strengthened in recent years by a number of treaties whereby pending
controversies have been adjusted by agreement or settled by arbitration or
otherwise provided for; so that now for, the first time there are no impor-
tant questions of difference outstanding between them, and being re-
solved that no future differences shall be a cause of hostilities between
them or interrupt their good relations and friendship;
The high contracting parties have, therefore, determined, in further-
ance of these ends, to conclude a treaty extending the scope and obliga-
tions of the policy of arbitration adopted in their present arbitration treaty
of April 4, 1908, so as to exclude certain exceptions contained in that
treaty and to provide means for the peaceful solution of all questions of
difference which it shall be found impossible in future to settle by diplo-
macy, and for that purpose they have appointed as their respective
plenipotentiaries:
The President of the United States of America, the Honorable Philan-
der C. Knox, Secretary of State of the United States; and
His Britannic Majesty, the Right Honorable James Bryce, 0. M., his
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Washington;
Who, having communicated to one another their full powers, found
in good and due form, have agreed upon the following articles:
ARTICLE 1.
All differences hereafter arising between the high contracting parties,
which it has not been possible to adjust by diplomacy, relating to interna-
tional matters in which the high contracting parties are concerned by vir-
tue of a claim of right made by one against the other under treaty or
otherwise, and which are justiciable in their nature by reason of being
susceptible of decision by the application of the principles of law or equity,
shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of Arbitration established at
The Hague by the Convention of October 18, 1907, or to some other arbi-
tral tribunal as may be decided in each case by special agreement, which
special agreement shall provide for the organization of such tribunal if
necessary, define the scope of the powers of the arbitrators, the question
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or questions at issue, and settle the terms of reference and the procedure
thereunder.
The provisions of Articles 37 to 90, inclusive, of the Convention for
the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes concluded at the Second
Peace Conference at The Hague on the 18th October, 1907, so far as ap-
plicable, and unless they are inconsistent with or modified by the provi-
sions of the special agreement to be concluded in each case, and
excepting Articles 53 and 54 of such convention, shall govern the arbitra-
tion proceedings to be taken under this treaty.
The special agreement in each case shall be made on the part of the
United States by the President of the United States, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate thereof, His Majesty's Government reserving
the right before concluding a special agreement in any matter affecting
the interests of a self-governing dominion of the British Empire to obtain
the concurrence therein of the government of that dominion.
Such agreements shall be binding when confirmed by the two govern-
ments by an exchange of notes.
ARTICLE II.
The high contracting parties further agree to institute as occasion
arises, and as hereinafter provided, a joint high commission of inquiry to
which, upon the request of either party, shall be referred for impartial and
conscientious investigation any controversy between the parties within the
scope of Article I, before such controversy has been submitted to arbitra-
tion, and also any other controversy hereafter arising between them even
if they are not agreed that it falls within the scope of Article I; provided,
however, that such reference may be postponed until the expiration of
one year after the date of the formal request therefor, in order to afford
an opportunity for diplomatic discussion and adjustment of the questions
in controversy, if either party desires such postponement.
Whenever a question or matter of difference is referred to the joint
high commission of inquiry, as herein provided, each of the high con-
tracting parties shall designate three of its nationals to act as members of
the commission of inquiry for the purposes of such reference; or the com-
mission may be otherwise constituted in any particular case by the terms of
reference, the membership of the commission and the terms of reference
to be determined in each case by an exchange of notes.
The provisions of Articles 9 to 36, inclusive, of the Convention for the
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes concluded at The Hague on
the 18th October, 1907, so far as applicable and unless they are inconsis-
tent with the provisions of this treaty, or are modified by the terms of
reference agreed upon in any particular case, shall govern the organiza-
tion and procedure of the commission.
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ARTICLE III.
The joint high commission of inquiry, instituted in each case as pro-
vided for in Article II, is authorized to examine into and report upon the
particular questions or matters referred to it, for the purpose of facilitat-
ing the solution of disputes by elucidating the facts, and to define the
issues presented by such questions, and also to include in its report such
recommendations and conclusions as may be appropriate.
The reports of the commission shall not be regarded as decisions of
the questions or matters so submitted either on the facts or on the law and
shall in no way have the character of an arbitral award.
It is further agreed, however, that in cases in which the parties disa-
gree as to whether or not a difference is subject to arbitration under Arti-
cle I of this treaty, that question shall be submitted to the joint high
commission of inquiry; and if all or all but one of the members of the
commission agree and report that such difference is within the scope of
Article I, it shall be referred to arbitration in accordance with the provi-
sions of this treaty.
ARTICLE IV.
The commission shall have power to administer oaths to witnesses
and take evidence on oath whenever deemed necessary in any proceeding,
or inquiry, or matter within its jurisdiction under this treaty; and the high
contracting parties agree to adopt such legislation as may be appropriate
and necessary to give the commission the powers above mentioned, and
to provide for the issue of subpoenas and for compelling the attendance
of witnesses in the proceedings before the commission.
On the inquiry both sides must be heard, and each party is entitled to
appoint an agent, whose duty it shall be to represent his government
before the commission and to present to the commission, either person-
ally or through counsel retained for that purpose, such evidence and argu-
ments as he may deem necessary and appropriate for the information of
the commission.
ARTICLE V.
The commission shall meet whenever called upon to make an exami-
nation and report under the terms of this treaty, and the commission may
fix such times and places for its meetings as may be necessary, subject at all
times to special call or direction of the two governments. Each commis-
sioner, upon the first joint meeting of the commission after his appoint-
ment, shall, before proceeding with the work of the commission, make
and subscribe a solemn declaration in writing that he will faithfully and
impartially perform the duties imposed upon him under this treaty, and




The United States and British sections of the commission may each
appoint a secretary, and these shall act as joint secretaries of the commis-
sion at its joint sessions, and the commission may employ experts and cler-
ical assistants from time to time as it may deem advisable. The salaries and
personal expenses of the commission and of the agents and counsel and
of the secretaries shall be paid by their respective governments and all
reasonable and necessary joint expenses of the commission incurred by it
shall be paid in equal moieties by the high contracting parties.
ARTICLE VI.
This treaty shall supersede the arbitration treaty concluded between
the high contracting parties on April 4, 1908, but all agreements, awards,
and proceedings under that treaty shall continue in force and effect and
this treaty shall not affect in any way the provisions of the treaty ofJanuary
11, 1909, relating to questions arising between the United States and the
Dominion of Canada.
ARTICLE VII.
The present treaty shall be ratified by the President of the United
States of America, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate
thereof, and by His Britannic Majesty. The ratifications shall be ex-
changed at Washington as soon as possible and the treaty shall take effect
on the date of the exchange of its ratifications. It shall thereafter remain
in force continuously unless and until terminated by twenty-four months'
written notice given by either high contracting party to the other.
In faith whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed this
treaty in duplicate and have hereunto affixed their seals.
Done at Washington the third day of August, in the year of our Lord
one thousand nine hundred and eleven.
[SEAL.] PHILANDER C. KNOX.
[SEAL.] JAMES BRYCE.
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